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ABSTRACT
The history of the Civil Rights Movement is often about resistance (both non­
violent and violent) to racist environments. In Roanoke, Virginia, it took nearly 
twenty years to integrate city schools, yet opposition by the African American 
community has been nearly forgotten. School closings in Prince Edward County 
became the enduring image of civil rights in Virginia, while historians have 
generally ignored the patterns of desegregation in Roanoke and other areas in 
western Virginia because they assumed integration there to be a smooth 
transition. The case study of Roanoke provides a very different response to civil 
rights in Virginia that was directed by the city’s white and black elites. While 
change elsewhere was volatile, change in Roanoke occurred at a much slower 
pace, a pace comfortable for these leaders. Roanoke’s history does not mirror 
the traditional model of civil rights action spearheaded by youth and challenges 
traditional views of Virginia’s postwar twentieth century political history. At the 
same time, Roanoke’s integration shows that even where whites and blacks 
generally frowned upon racial violence, children could still receive psychological 
scars.
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Introduction
The School Board of Roanoke City welcomed Dr. Harry T. Penn, a dentist 
and “Negro political leader,” to its monthly meeting on July 14, 1948.1 Roanoke’s 
morning newspaper announced the public school system would now be 
desegregated on page four, under a misleading title. Dr. Penn’s rise to the 
formerly all-white school board came two years before the University of Virginia 
desegregated its law school, said to be the first public institution desegregated in 
Virginia.2 Yet the act earned little public comment from Roanoke’s white 
observers. Penn’s promise “to render service, not to any one class, but to all” 
received less newspaper ink than new cafeteria equipment for a Junior High 
School. This would not be the last news on Roanoke’s desegregation to be 
hidden from the public, nor would it signify the approach of integrated public 
schools. These did not come until over a quarter century of struggle.
The history of the Civil Rights Movement is often about resistance (both 
non-violent and violent) to racist environments. In Roanoke, Virginia, passive 
resistance to all forms of desegregation delayed meaningful integration longer 
than massive resistance. “Civil” politics and a lack of open conflict ensured that 
change came at a pace comfortable to white leaders. As school closings in 
Prince Edward County became the enduring image of civil rights in Virginia, 
historians generally ignored the patterns of desegregation in Roanoke and other
1 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, July 14, 1948, 1. Roanoke Times, “School Board 
Renames Smith, Two New Members Seated at Organization Meet,” July 15, 1948, 4.
2 Peter Wallenstein, Cradle o f America: Four Centuries o f Virginia History (Lawrence, University 
Press of Kansas, 2007), 336-342.
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areas of western Virginia because they assumed integration there to be a smooth 
transition.3 The case study of Roanoke provides a very different response to civil 
rights in Virginia that was directed by the city’s white and black elites. While 
change elsewhere was volatile, change in Roanoke occurred at a much slower 
pace, a pace acceptable to these leaders. Roanoke’s history does not mirror the 
traditional model of civil rights action spearheaded by youth and challenges 
traditional views of Virginia’s postwar twentieth century political history. At the 
same time, Roanoke’s integration shows that even where whites and blacks 
generally frowned upon racial violence, children could still receive scars, both 
physical and psychological.
Yet the damage done was more subtle than that thrust upon communities 
in eastern Virginia. After all, the State’s massive resisters closed school systems, 
amended the state constitution, and even razed entire neighborhoods to avoid 
desegregating schools.4 As a candidate for Governor, Lindsay J. Almond 
famously stated that he “would rather lose [his] right arm than see the first nigra 
child admitted to the white schools of Virginia” during a campaign speech in 
Roanoke’s all-white Jefferson High School.5 Despite Almond’s fiery rhetoric, 
Roanoke always considered itself more progressive towards African Americans
3 Heinemann, Ronald, John G. Kolp, Anthony S. Parent Jr, William G. Spade. Old Dominion, New 
Commonwealth: A History o f Virginia, 1607-2007 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2007), 
348.
4 Forest White, Pride or Prejudice: School Reform and Urban Renewal in Norfolk, 1950-1959 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1992). White persuasively argues that Norfolk’s Mayor 
Duckworth used urban renewal as a blunt tool to raze neighborhoods that had threatened 
desegregation.
5 Linwood Holton, Opportunity Time (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 51.
Years afterward Roanoke’s African Americans would jokingly refer to him as “one-armed 
Lindsay.”
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than the rest of Virginia. Former NAACP President Alphonso Holland, concluded 
the city deserved “an A minus for all they have done.” From A. L. Holland’s 
perspective, Roanoke managed civil rights laws in a fairer way than many of 
Virginia’s communities. Over Holland’s lifetime he saw segregation’s 
dehumanizing effect on African Americans and so any progress was positive. Yet, 
his assessment did not console African American students who attended 
overcrowded, outdated schools while the board quietly resisted desegregation 
plans. The desegregation process in their public schools started in 1948 but was 
not effectively over until 1974.6 Why did a city that prided itself on “good” racial 
relations take almost two decades to achieve effective desegregation? City 
officials only moved as far as federal courts forced them, while they actively 
claimed to desegregate more quickly.
Part of the explanation can be found in Roanoke’s social geography. It 
was a very segregated city with most of the African American population living 
immediately north of downtown while whites lived in the south and along city- 
county borders. Roanoke also had a much lower proportion of African Americans 
than the rest of Virginia. The academic consensus on Virginia’s twentieth century 
history considers desegregation almost a non-factor in the western portion of the 
state because so few African Americans resided there.7 Although in the late
6 The end date refers to an appeals case won by the City in which the decision certified that the 
schools had a balanced racial ratio. Due to increased housing segregation, recent Supreme 
Court decisions, and a revitalized neighborhood schools movement, Roanoke City Schools, like 
those around the country have re-segregated in the past two decades.
7 James Ely, The Crisis o f Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of 
Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 110. See Appendix B for 
a map on African American population distribution in Virginia at this time.
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nineteenth century the black community made up a third of Roanoke’s total 
population, by 1950, the population of Roanoke was 91,921 with 14,575 African 
Americans comprising less than twenty percent.8 In 1961, journalist Benjamin 
Muse, asserted that “race prejudice is at a minimum” in northern and western 
Virginia where “negroes are few.”9 The city leadership echoed this sentiment. 
Throughout the school debates, individuals, black and white, spoke of the great 
relations enjoyed in the city compared to other places in the South.10 Many in the 
city worked hard to maintain a moderate, civilized image, but not all held this 
perspective. The school board chairman once advised a black member of the 
school board to “just keep in mind [that] all the Mississippi thinking people are not 
in Mississippi.”11
By revealing the stories of many who lived through desegregation, I hope 
to challenge historians who describe desegregation in Virginia as a process that 
lasted less than a decade, began with the Brown Decision, underwent Massive 
Resistance, achieved legal and legislative recourse, and saved public schools. In 
Roanoke, massive resistance never became an official policy. With Roanoke’s 
school desegregation and the movement for civil rights, a pattern of leadership 
emerged in which members of the African American middle class agreed to
8 US Census Data, 1950, Roanoke City, VA. This is about 15% of the population, a fairly high 
number for western Virginia (nearby Wythe County had only 4.6% in 1950). In Surry County, 
located in Southside Virginia, 63.7% of the population was African American in 1950.
9 Benjamin Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 
6 .
10 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, April 13, 1964, 7. Dr. Paxton, a black school board 
member, says “This is a fine city with splendid race relations” but he does not “want to see 
Roanoke have the same difficulties other communities have had.”
11 “Warren,” Interview with Author, June 15, 2005, Roanoke, VApg 8.
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minimize open conflict in return for a voice in some city decisions. Indeed, 
prominent African American leaders did have constant representation in local 
government. After Dr. Penn’s original victory, the school board had numerous 
important African American representatives including the Reverend A.L. James 
who replaced Dr. Penn in 1951. Dr. Wendell Butler rose to chairman of the city 
school board from 1975 to 1980. The City elected Reverend Noel C. Taylor to 
City Council in 1970 and then Mayor from 1975 to 1992. Yet, for twenty five years 
Roanoke had African American representation on a school board that did not 
move towards desegregation unless forced to do so by judicial mandate. This 
thesis examines how and why this happened, and what Roanoke’s story 
contributes to our understanding of both Virginia’s history as well as that of the 
civil rights movement.
Though important, newspaper articles, court briefs, school board minutes, 
and desegregation plans leave critical gaps in the history of school 
desegregation in Roanoke. City leaders primarily created these documents and 
left their own perspective on the record. The participants themselves tell a more 
complex narrative.12 Many meetings took place behind closed doors or in
12 Several interviews were conducted between 2004-2007. The interviewees range from some of 
the first integrated students, teachers, school administrators, politicians, parents of students, 
school board members, and many others white and black, male and female. They are part of a 
larger project on school desegregation in western Virginia conducted by Ted DeLaney and 
other professors at Washington and Lee University. As the project is ongoing and many of the 
participants have not yet had a chance to edit and return transcripts of the interviews, they 
remain anonymous but are identified with pseudonyms (“Fred,” “Ella”) and by their relationship 
to the project (a black student, a white teacher, etc.). Their words often do a much better job 
than mine of explaining the emotions and atmosphere involved. The Harrison Museum of 
African American Culture conducted several oral histories in the early 1990s with African 
American community leaders about the communities history in the twentieth-century, with topics 
ranging from the local All-black life saving crew to urban renewal, and especially civil rights. 
Tapes of several interviews conducted by Lillian Potter have also been used. These feature 
important members of the white and black communities, including several white ministers
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executive session. This study of desegregation in Roanoke will not use oral 
histories to supply facts that provide alternative explanations; instead, as 
Elizabeth Tonkin argues, these oral histories make us “uncomfortably aware of 
the elusive quality of historical truth itself.”13 These oral sources will challenge 
Roanoke’s popular historical myth of “good race relations” and how it compares 
to other “moderate” Southern cities.
Roanoke was one of several “moderate” southern cities. Many scholars 
have examined such cities as case studies illuminating larger aspects of the civil 
rights movement. These included William Chafe’s history of Greensboro, North 
Carolina and Davison Douglas’ work on Charlotte. Like Roanoke, leaders in 
these cities made a conscious decision that token desegregation provided 
economic benefits. Moderate cities had their own “civil” politics which proved 
problematic to African American leaders who had to follow these political 
limitations, while still engaging in meaningful change. In Greensboro, Chafe 
points to activist students who led direct protests to racial injustice and “civil” 
politics.14 Douglas saw similar popular movements at work in Charlotte during the 
early 1960s era of desegregation, but by 1970 it was legal activism that brought
involved in integration. Finally, the author conducted a round of interviews with additional 
students, teachers, and community members. William and Mary’s Institutional Review Board 
approved the interview protocol, but per IRB requirements some of these interviews were 
destroyed and are unavailable for future researchers.
13 Alessandro Portelli, The Death o f Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), viii-ix.
14 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black
Struggle for Freedom  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1-12.
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about the most change.15 In Roanoke, no African American college drew student 
activists to protest with the volume of those in Greensboro. Likewise, Roanoke 
followed a similar legal path to Charlotte, but its busing system looked radically 
different from Charlotte’s. These major differences helped shape Roanoke and 
ultimately delayed meaningful integration.
Roanoke’s Early Racial History
Major racial conflicts rocked Roanoke at the height of its nineteenth 
century economic boom and these played an important role in developing its 
“civilized” reaction to threats of racial violence. One resident mentioned how the 
early history affected such thinking: “that lynching, was such ancient history that 
was buried and left. Because it would bring to rise something that the [city] 
leadership thought ‘well we don’t want this anymore because it will never happen 
again.’”16 The early history of Roanoke’s African American community provided 
an important context to its politics of respectability.
Hilly and remote, western Virginia generally did not support tobacco 
farming as easily as the Tidewater region. The culture of tobacco and a 
plantation slave labor system did not spread to the former as it did in the latter. 
As a result, western Virginia generally had a much smaller African American 
population.17 When the Supreme Court first announced the Brown decision, the
15 Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Desegregation o f the Charlotte Schools
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1-5.
16 “Fred,” White male teacher, Interview with Author, June 14, 2005, Roanoke, VA, 16.
17 See Appendix A
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Roanoke Times reinforced the fact that the ruling did not apply to Buchanan 
County in Southwestern Virginia, as no African Americans resided there.18
Roanoke was a city forged by the railroads and this had important 
consequences for its geographic and economic development.19 The Virginia and 
Tennessee Railroad which became the Norfolk and Western, then the Norfolk 
Southern, crossed through a swamp named Big Lick. At this intersection of two 
lines, a city named after the nearby Roanoke River was born.20 With the railroad 
came increased migration, commerce, and industry. As a “Magic City” in the New 
South, Roanoke grew by “around 2,000 percent from 1882-1890.”21 This 
tremendous growth brought businessmen from the North who hoped to make 
money on Roanoke’s boomtown status. The presence of so many northerners, 
compared to so few native Virginians made Roanoke rather unique among 
Virginia cities and indeed, cities throughout the South.
Despite its unique population, Roanoke was not immune to the post­
reconstruction racial conflict that plagued other southern cities. Several cases of
18 “Ban Does Not Affect Schools in Buchanan” Roanoke Times, May 19, 1954.
19 Raymond P. Barnes, A History o f the City o f Roanoke, (Radford, Virginia; Commonwealth 
Press, 1968), 48-49. Barnes’ work is a business oriented chronology. As a source for dates, 
place names, and early history his book is more successful than as a scholarly history. It ends 
in 1940 and has little perspective on desegregation issues.
20 Roanoke was originally named Big Lick because the swampy area actually contained a 
significant salinity. Local wildlife flocked to the area, because it provided them salt which they 
could not ingest in other ways. This “salt lick” became “Big Lick.” When the N&W railroad 
decided to make Big Lick a major terminus, it changed its name to the better sounding 
Roanoke, after the nearby Roanoke River.
21 Rand Dotson, Roanoke, Virginia, 1882-1912: Magic City o f the New South (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2007), 239. There are several “Magic Cities” in the south, all 
named because of their “magic” growth, the most famous is Birmingham, Alabama which had 
the second highest percentage of growth behind Roanoke.
lynching within the city attest to this. The first notable case came in 1892 with the 
lynching of William Lavender by a group of masked men.22 No one was convicted 
of any crimes related to the lynching, and city chroniclers considered it a 
“civilized” lynching conducted by “respectable citizens.”23 Another lynching 
occurred a year later. This time, a mob of poor whites lynched Thomas Smith. 
Unlike the previous vigilante violence sanctioned by city leaders, the mayor 
attempted to protect the accused and called in the city militia. Eight citizens died 
in the ensuing riot. Roanoke's violence spurred a state-wide response to limit 
such lawless behavior.24 The Magic City of the South, as Roanoke’s boosters 
referred to the city, was far from perfect.25 Statewide disgust toward the 
“Roanoke Riot of 1893” led to new legislation that discouraged lynchings and the 
mob rule that caused them. Roanoke worked hard to polish its image, but for the 
city’s African American residents accused of capital crimes, officially sanctioned 
“justice” replaced that of vigilantes.26 Roanoke’s 19th century leadership looked at 
the separate incidents based on how they were conducted, not based on the
22 Barnes, History o f Roanoke, 245.
23 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 127-129.
24 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 160. Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 129, 149-150. 
Dotson includes lyrics to the “Roanoke Riot” or “Roanoke Outrage.” The riot occurred during a 
serious economic depression in Roanoke. With the N&W railroad under reorganization, several 
factories closed or layed off workers and four of the City’s seven banks failed. One bank even 
repossessed an Episcopal Church and sold it at auction to meet delinquent mortagage 
payments (Dotson, 129).
25 Roanoke is often referred to as the “Star City of the South” because of the very large 
illuminated star that sits atop Mill Mountain and can be seen throughout the city. In the 19th 
century, boosters called Roanoke the “Magic City” because it grew so rapidly, as if by magic.
26 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 123-124. Dotson points out that the result for African 
Americans was essentially the same before and after the riot: Jim Crow racism
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eventual results- extralegal and brutal lynching. When the struggle over school 
desegregation came to Roanoke, the city leaders also focused on how the 
process would appear to the outside world, and minimized conflict. As with 19th 
century lynching or passive resistance to school desegregation in the twentieth, it 
was the African American community that suffered.
In Roanoke, as in the rest of Virginia, the needs of the black community 
were subordinate to the needs of the white community. The city’s residential 
segregation reiterated this political hierarchy, which was not only by custom, but 
by law. Besides white northerners, the railroad brought many African Americans 
hoping to work the unskilled labor positions required by the railroad. Even in the 
nineteenth century, the African American community, according to historian Rand 
Dotson, “lived in clusters along the same streets, the vast majority worked similar 
unskilled or day labor jobs, and most patronized the same all-black saloons and 
dance halls.”27 While each section had general political autonomy, the all-white 
city hall made the rules. In 1913, this included an ordinance banning the sale of 
previously white owned homes to African Americans and African Americans who 
bought such homes would be at fault. In 1917, the Supreme Court struck down 
residential segregation ordinances in the Buchanan v. Warley case, but many 
communities in Virginia ignored the decision, including Roanoke.28 Though the 
NAACP Ledgal Defense Fund was successful in bringing suit against residential
27 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 122.
28 Naomi A. Mattos, “Segregation by Custom vs. Segregation by Law: Residential Segregation 
Ordinances and Their Effects on the City of Roanoke, 1910-1917,” (Paper Prepared for the 
Roanoke Regional Preservation Office, 2005), 23-27. Roanoke had codified its residential 
segregation in 1913. Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the code stayed on the city’s books for 
years afterward.
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segregation ordinances, communities continued to flaunt the prevailing case 
law.29 In 1921, city officials called a meeting with leaders of the black community. 
City leaders intended to discuss a resolution verifying residential segregation of 
the city after some encroachment by blacks into all-white neighborhoods. African 
American leaders hoped to address the terrible conditions in their 
neighborhoods. Most areas lacked paved streets, sewers, gas, or electricity and 
reports indicated poor conditions at schools. The meeting ended when the two 
sides realized they had irreconcilable agendas.30 The rigid residential 
segregation continued as evidenced by Roanoke Times advertisements like 
“Modern Homes for Colored People” in the 1920s.31
This de facto segregation continued into the post-war period. By then, the 
city could be divided into four quadrants: Northwest, Northeast, Southwest, and 
Southeast. Each of these quadrants had a specific racial and class character with 
most of the poorest blacks resided in the Northeast in close proximity to the 
railroad yards, the riverside industry, and the brick factory. Middle-class African 
Americans lived in the Northwest. White areas of town were as segregated by 
class. More affluent whites lived in the Southwest part of town; the Southeast 
remained distinctly blue collar and white. There was little movement of people 
between quadrants and none between white and black areas of town. When
29 Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 1956-61 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1994), 84-84.
30 J. Douglas Smith, Managing White Supremacy: Race, Politics, and Citizenship in Jim Crow 
Virginia, (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 71.
31 Advertisement, Roanoke Times, April 11, 1922 as quoted in Mattos, “Segregation by Custom,” 
Exhibit 3. The housing for sale was located in the Gainesboro neighborhood, then in transition 
from white to black. Offers would only be made to “high class colored people.”
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residential segregation was threatened, whites responded harshly. After Leonard 
Williams, an African American manager at an ABC store moved across the 10th 
St. racial dividing line in 1959, white teenagers threatened him and later tossed 
eggs, rocks, and firecrackers through his windows. Responding to one occasion, 
he “reached down and grabbed [his] 38 [caliber revolver] and put it up...[he said] 
‘here’s what you all want, right here... move.’” On another occasion, as his wife 
“sat on the front porch there and ... had [white neighbors] pass by many times. 
‘Get out niggers!’ hollering and screaming loud as they [could].”32 According to 
another black resident,, South Roanoke was “kind of an area which was taboo to 
black people.”33 This extreme segregation made it easy to keep the black and 
white communities insulated from one another and friction between them to a 
minimum. While this limited violence, it would cause significant trouble to 
complete integration of Roanoke schools. The physical distance added to 
Roanoke’s “moderate” response, but also became one more factor to delay 
implementation of the Supreme Court’s most famous decision.
Brown Comes to Virginia
On May 17, 1954, the school board of Roanoke gathered to meet at the 
administration building around 8:00 PM. That morning, Chief Justice Earl Warren 
announced perhaps the most important and far reaching court decision of the 
twentieth century. On such a momentous day, Roanoke City’s school board met
32 Leonard A. Williams, Interview with Michael Cooke, June 16, 1992, Oral History Collection, 
Harrison Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia, 20-25. Ibid. 26.
33 “Ella,” Black Mother, Interview with Morgan Hill, June 15, 2005, 3.
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but issued no momentous decisions. Instead, Leroy H. Smith tendered his 
resignation because “the textile markets [had] been in rather unstable condition.” 
Likewise, Rev. A.L. James terminated his service to the board due to health 
problems.34 These excuses were plausible. Smith had served on the board for 
over 15 years and James died only three years after resigning. Yet, no one 
mentioned the elephant in the room: the Brown Decision.
It is difficult to forecast whether desegregation may have come to 
Roanoke City more quickly had the board’s most respected members remained 
for its implementation.35 Considering Virginia’s state-wide massive resistance 
legislation, Roanoke might have been forced to wait the six years it took for even 
token desegregation to occur. But the decision by James and Smith to avoid 
what they knew would be a long, difficult, and unpopular path continued a pattern 
of racial relations. Roanoke would choose foot dragging over confronting what 
the Roanoke Times called the South’s “most critical problem since 
reconstruction.”36
It is impossible to tell the story of desegregation in Roanoke without 
putting it in the context of the state-wide and national desegregation narrative. 
The Brown Decision was actually five separate cases including plaintiffs from 
Topeka, Kansas; Clarendon County, South Carolina; Hockessin, Delaware; 
Washington, DC; and Prince Edward County, Virginia. Of these, the story of
34 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, May 17, 1954, pg 5-6.
35 At times, “Roanoke” will be referred to in this paper. This always refers to Roanoke City. The full 
name will be used whenever Roanoke County is the subject.
36“Editorial: Coeducation and Integrated Schools,” Roanoke Times, July 12, 1954.
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Prince Edward County, where African Americans were nearly half the county’s 
population, is most relevant as it became the symbol of Virginia’s school 
desegregation narrative.
In many ways, the Southside area was an unlikely place for the frontlines 
of school desegregation in Virginia. The local NAACP leadership even tried to 
discourage mass protest against segregated education initially due to the forces 
arrayed against them.37 Prince Edward County was 44% African American, but 
run by notoriously conservative white citizens. The case in Prince Edward County 
revolved around Robert Moton High School in Farmville, Virginia. Moton was the 
town’s black high school and badly neglected. To cope with its overcrowding, the 
school board erected three low temporary buildings topped with black tar paper. 
The “tar paper shacks,” as African Americans dubbed them, angered the 
community as they had heavily contributed to a municipal bond offering in 1948, 
partly to improve local education. The school board gave the NAACP chapter 
president, the Reverend L. Francis Griffin, little redress. Finally a Moton PTA 
committee devoted to lobbying for a new school was told that there was no point 
in returning to the monthly school board meetings as no improvements were 
forthcoming.38
It was at this point that the Prince Edward County story became 
interesting. Ajunior at Robert Moton High School, Barbara Johns, decided to take
37 Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board o f Education and the Civil Rights Movement (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 55.
38 Patterson, Brown v. Board, 25. Bob Smith, They Closed Their Schools: Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, 1951-1964, (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 13, 18, 25. This 
work is more of a journalistic view of the desegregation controversy in Prince Edward County, 
but it does provide a very good account of the happenings prior to 1965.
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matters into her own hands. Johns was the niece of the Reverend Vernon Johns, 
a pastor at Dexter Street Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, and a figure in 
the civil rights movement.39 In 1951, following further foot dragging by the School 
Board of Prince Edward County, Johns secretly organized a strike by the 
students of Moton High. Years before mass protests in Montgomery, most of the 
students walked out of class and refused to return. They marched with 
homemade placards displaying slogans like “We Want a New School or None At 
All” and “Down with the Tar Paper Shacks.”40 In a notice about a mass meeting of 
the PTA and NAACP about the case being filed, the black leaders reminded the 
community that “the eyes of the world are on us.”41 The students stayed out of 
school for two weeks. Initially, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) was 
hesitant to take the case. The students pressed for equalization of funding for 
white and black schools; the “equal” of “separate, but equal.” The LDF committed 
to a strategy of overturning segregation, rather than equalization of separate 
facilities. Also, Prince Edward County would be one of the worst environments to 
receive a favorable decision. Likewise, plaintiffs could expect far more retribution 
and attack than in a more moderate Virginia community. Over these concerns, 
the students and their parents chose to fight against segregation and, with the 
help of NAACP LDF Lawyers, Spotswood Robinson and Oliver Hill, the students
39 Patterson, Brown V. Board, 28.
40 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 40.
41 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 58.
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sued the School Board of Prince George’s County. The case was eventually 
added to the Brown v. Board cases 42
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced that in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal’ has no place.”43 In the days 
and months following the first decision, the Roanoke Times issued several 
editorials cautioning against radical change in the wake of the decision. A July 4th 
editorial promoted finding middle ground “between social theories of the 
Supreme Court and the obfuscations of those who would radically alter our 
political system.”44 The Times fluctuated between advocating research on school 
systems segregated by sex and moving slowly on both plans for desegregation 
and plans advocating massive resistance. On Roanoke City’s school board, two 
of its most prominent members resigned and Brown went unmentioned.
Though the court ruled segregation in public schools unconstitutional in 
the first Brown decision, the justices waited to recommend any specific recourse 
for school districts and asked for advice from each state as to the best course of 
action. A year after the original verdict, the Supreme Court announced what 
would be called “Brown II." This decision instructed the Federal District and 
Appeals Courts to require defendants to begin a “prompt and reasonable start 
toward full compliance” with Brown. The district courts would also be required to 
“enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and
42Klarman, Brown v. Board o f Education, 55.
43 Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
44 “1776- We, the people- 1954,” Roanoke Times, July 4,1954.
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proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all 
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”45
The Supreme Court appeared to mollify the South with a decision that 
would give them plenty of time to create plans for desegregation. The ruling also 
focused solely on the defendants and did not require immediate universal 
desegregation of other schools. The members of each school district would have 
to fight their way through the courts before schools would be desegregated. 
Finally, the phrase “all deliberate speed” came to mean “all deliberate delay” to 
most school districts, including Roanoke’s.
In order to generate a plan to resist the Supreme Court ruling, the state’s 
governor, Thomas Stanley, created a commission of legislators led by Senator 
Garland Gray. Stanley immediately announced that there would be no integration 
for the school year 1954-55 in order to study the problem. Senator Byrd began 
drafting what would become the Southern Manifesto in 1956, a statement signed 
by the eighty-two Representatives and nineteen Senators and entered into 
congressional record alleging the Brown decision to be an illegal intrusion on 
State’s Rights. They promised to keep their home districts segregated. Massive 
Resistance had begun.46
45 Brown V. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) from Patterson, Brown V. Board, 
84.
46 For more on Massive Resistance see Ely, Crisis o f Conservative Virginia; Gates, The Making of 
Massive Resistance; James Howard Hershman, Jr. There’s a Rumbling in the Museum: The 
Opponents o f Virginia’s Massive Resistance (University of Virginia: Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, 1978); Brian Daugherity ‘“ Keep on Keeping On’: African Americans and the 
Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia” in With A ll Deliberate Speed: 
Implementing Brown v. Board o f Education (Little Rock: University of Arkansas Press, 2008).
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Massive Resistance refers specifically to a political movement that sought 
to avoid federally mandated desegregation by creating state laws to penalize any 
district planning to desegregate, whether voluntarily or by court order. It lasted 
from 1955 to 1964 in some areas, like Prince Edward County. The movement 
was most powerful from 1956 until 1958 when courts overturned most massive 
resistance legislation. In Virginia, the mechanism for resisting was a law that 
would go into effect once an African American student threatened to desegregate 
a white school. The school board would immediately lose control of their system 
and the Virginia Governor would determine its fate which was, in the case of 
Prince Edward County, closure.
Along with closing schools, Senator Byrd called for amendments to 
Virginia’s constitution allowing the state legislature to appropriate money to 
private, segregated academies and repealing mandatory public education 
clauses. Virginia’s massive resisters considered themselves part of a political 
movement, but despite their contempt for federal rulings they did not openly 
advocate racial violence as some leaders did in the Deep South.47 Passive 
resistance, on the other hand, was not an organized political movement, but a 
style of avoiding major integration by allowing token desegregation, discouraging 
litigation, and staying quiet on the subject. Passive and Massive Resistance were 
political strategies of perpetuating racial segregation but did not actively 
encourage racial violence in any way.
47 Heinemann, Ronald, Harry Byrd o f Virginia (Charlottesville; University of Virginia Press, 1996), 
353-354.
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Though not the official policy, many groups did encourage such violence.
In Richmond, a new organization formed to enforce segregation through personal
terror and coercion. The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Independent
Liberties formed on October 8th, 1954. Like other pro-white groups such as the
Klan, Anglo-Saxon Clubs, and White Citizens’ Councils, the Defenders of State
Sovereignty pressured School Boards in each county to resist integration. Even
Roanoke County might have gotten a visit from Supporters of this organization
who came to Roanoke when, according to a white teacher of Roanoke County
and City Schools:
Three white guys, kind of rough but presentable looking; they came 
in and had a private conference with the Principal... They came 
and said, ‘Mr. Johnson we are concerned with what is taking place 
and what has taken place. We want you to know if you need any 
help in regards to the welfare of the white students under these 
circumstances, we are there to help.’48
The group was particularly active in Prince Edward County and helped galvanize
white opinion to support massive resistance. Moderates were left with little choice
between closing public schools rather than desegregate or joining white liberals
and black supporters of integration shunned by mainstream white society.
Indeed, the Reverend James R. Kennedy, the pastor of white Farmville
Presbyterian Church, felt that “as a Christian, [he couldn’t] defend segregation...
[because] you can’t take the gospel with its great message of His love for
everyone and defend enforced segregation.”49 Kennedy was run out of town for
48 “Fred,” white male school teacher, June 14, 2005, 4. It is to be noted that this is secondhand 
information to the interviewee, but there is no reason to question its authenticity.
49 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 126.
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his support of keeping schools open despite the risk of desegregation. Though
he did not consider himself an integrationist, Kennedy received swift castigation.
Moderates had great trouble finding a middle ground in the debate throughout
eastern Virginia and the rest of the South. More than many political issues,
desegregation polarized communities. In Roanoke, society did not literally kick
moderates out of town, but public moderate views often brought social
marginalization. One white parent described the atmosphere:
The people that were opposed to it were more outspoken and when 
we get together to play cards or have friends in for dinner and sit 
around and have coffee and talk about things, that was usually the 
situation. The folks that were opposed were pretty outspoken about 
it and vehement about it.50
Publicly, white Roanokers hesitated to discuss desegregation, but privately, the
topic occupied many conversations.
In the midst of local debates on integration, the Gray Commission, a blue
ribbon group tasked with determining a state-wide policy that would meet federal
law, reported its findings. It recommended a state policy of having no white
children attend an integrated school against the will of their parents. Integration
of schools would be determined by community choice. Local schools could also
be closed by community choice rather than desegregate. Parents who did not
wish their child to attend an integrated school would be given tuition grants to
private segregated schools.51 The idea of tuition grants would be a part of many
desegregation plans in the years to come as an “escape clause.” In localities
50“Greg,” June 22, 2005, white parent and local politician, 4.
51 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 141.
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around the state, private schools sprang up to meet the new demand for 
segregated schooling. Even citizens in Roanoke created new segregated private 
schools. In nearby Bedford County, the Bedford Academy was created on the 
eve of desegregation and roughly half of the county’s white school children 
attended it.52
The maneuverings between Governor Stanley and the Gray Commission 
occurred in a highly politicized atmosphere and under the close supervision of 
Senator Harry F. Byrd, Virginia’s political leader since the end of the Second 
World War. Byrd’s political machine had almost complete control over key 
statewide positions, but in western Virginia his power was much weaker.
Because western Virginia had strong pockets of GOP support, it avoided the 
major fight between the Byrd machine and more independent Democrats like 
Harry Howell. Linwood Holton, one of western Virginia’s most successful 
politicians, articulated the disconnect between the eastern and western 
establishments: “It was then the perception of most southwestern Virginians... 
that the attitude of the Richmond establishment is that you’ve reached the end of 
the state when you get to Roanoke.”53 The distance from the Byrd machine also 
meant Roanoke politicians had more autonomy than politicians in eastern cities 
like Richmond or Norfolk.
52 “Fred,” 4 and “Jane,” a white female student integrated in Bedford County Schools in 1965, 4.
53 Holton, Opportunity Time, 7-8. A supporter had introduced Holton as “the Governor that knows 
Virginia doesn’t stop at Roanoke.” She said later, “Lin, Virginia does end at Roanoke, if you’re 
going east!”
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Despite the freedom to take a course independent from the Byrd machine, 
the Roanoke School Board sided with the Gray Commission and passed a 
resolution voicing its support of an amendment to Section 141 of the Virginia 
Constitution, which mandated that private schools not be funded with public 
money. The school board resolution did not pass unanimously. A white member 
and Dr. Lylburn Downing, the board’s lone African American member dissented. 
Following Roanoke’s code of civilized discussion, Dr. Downing observed that 
“even though he could not conscientiously vote otherwise, he certainly 
recognized the action of the board as an excellent example of the democratic 
way of transacting business.”54 The constitutional amendment was part of a 
referendum on segregation put in front of the voters only two weeks later. 
Segregationists billed it as a referendum for or against integration. The 
amendment passed in Roanoke by a small margin. Despite a reputation for 
moderation, Roanoke missed a curcial opportunity to support their public 
schools, delaying desegregation for years.
In 1956, Judge Sterling Hutchinson refused to obey the Supreme Court 
order requiring Prince Edward County to desegregate. He felt that his superiors 
in the Federal Court System understood neither the situation in the county nor 
the racial relations of Black Belt Virginia.55 Under Virginia’s massive resistance 
law, the governor closed these schools to stop their desegregation by federal 
court order. As moderates won seats in the 1958 state elections and the courts
54 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, December, 19, 1955, 4-5.
55 J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation 
(New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961), 213.
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ruled many of the laws and school closings unconstitutional, the local efforts at 
massive resistance waned. . . State and local politicians formulated a new plan of 
“passive resistance.” The ideas of “all deliberate delay” and token desegregation 
were the new tactics used by school boards around Virginia, including 
Roanoke’s.
Roanoke’s School System in the Era of Massive Resistance
Though the School Board preferred to focus on anything but 
desegregation, the Roanoke NAACP did not allow this complacency. In 1956, 
following the city-wide vote on funding private schools, the organization made a 
deliberate change to its previous strategy by electing African American attorney 
Reuben Lawson, “a militant President.” Lawson gave a powerful acceptance 
speech, arguing that “Our forebears were slaves and so are we, because we can 
never be free until every man is free... I shall contact the State Legal Head of 
NAACP and ask his help and advice as to procedures for bringing desegregation 
to Roanoke.”56 The result was a letter sent seven months later from Lawson to 
the school board inquiring into school desegregation plans for the fall of 1956. 
The Board “noted that the communication had been received from Mr. Lawson as 
an individual and not as a representative of any group” despite his official 
position as NAACP President. Dr. Lylburn Downing, the board’s only African 
American member, “observed that ‘it had to come up, sooner or later” but that he
56 “Roanoke Branch Elects Militant President At Crowded Meeting”, Roanoke Tribune, January 28, 
1956.
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“saw no reason for a hurried reply.”57 Well over a month later came the board’s 
unanimous response: “the Board does not contemplate at the present time, any 
change in the operation of the public schools in Roanoke.”58 In response to 
Lawson’s action, the Roanoke Times threatened that the [white] South might 
enact economic retribution against African Americans for pushing school 
integration. Referring to African Americans: “he knows that to force himself into a 
situation where he is not acceptable may prove more costly than profitable.”59 
This economic threat was clear. It had taken over eight months for Roanoke’s 
leaders, white and black, to decide that no action would occur in 1956. During 
this same time period, African Americans in Montgomery, Alabama waged one of 
the most successful mass protests of the civil rights movement. Compared to the 
Montgomery bus boycott, Roanoke’s relative silence was deafening.
Despite its sluggish pace, Roanoke’s African American community 
continued to push for improvements in education. Though newer black schools 
like Lucy Addison High School had excellent facilities, many were well below 
standards of white schools. In 1957, the Gainsboro Elementary PTA noted that 
the school still had no indoor plumbing, no cafeteria, auditorium, and was heated 
by wood stoves.60 That same year, students forced out of Northeast 
neighborhoods by the Commonwealth urban renewal project had overcrowded 
Gilmer and Loudon Elementary Schools. Their parents protested that if the
57 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, July 16, 1956, 3-5.
58 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, August 20, 1956, 17-18.
59 “Editorial: The Latest Move By the NAACP”, Roanoke Times, July 17, 1956.
60 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 11, 1957, 1-3.
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situation was not corrected, students would be forced to apply to West End 
Elementary, a white school. The board voted to defer action on the matter.61
The overcrowding at Gilmer and Loudon Elementary Schools was 
symptomatic of the entire Roanoke system. The School Board had responded to 
a boom in population with few new buildings. Classrooms were partitioned. 
Cafeterias, auditoriums, and storage closets were turned into classrooms. The 
administration finally turned to using morning and afternoon sessions in most of 
the schools. These would not be enough to check the post war baby boom. With 
little money coming from the state for new school construction, Roanoke had to 
turn to alternate sources for funds. In 1958, the city proposed a bond to raise 
money for a very ambitious school building program. This project supported the 
construction of two new high schools, new libraries, auditoriums, and over 80 
new classrooms in the white and black areas of town.
The city-wide political campaign over the $8 million bond was heated. In 
the end, the school bond issue passed with 54.9% of the vote, mostly with 
support from the African American community and white neighborhoods closest
61 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, October, 21, 1957, 4-5. Milton Garrison, “Supreme Court’s 
Action in Evidence At Roanoke School Board Meet,” Roanoke Times, October 22, 1957. This 
was likely an action with strong political overtones. Virginia was in the midst of a gubernatorial 
race between Republican Ted Dalton and Democrat Lindsay Almond. The two were scheduled 
for a debate in Roanoke on October 2nd. Furthermore, some of Almond’s resistance legislation 
had just been ruled unconstitutional by Federal Judge Walter Hoffman (who had been on 
Dalton’s ticket for Attorney General in 1953) with the Supreme Court declining to grant it 
certiorari. Almond was particularly embarrassed by the action because he had been Virginia’s 
Attorney General and primarily created the legislation to resist judicial scrutiny. For more on 
how Virginian and national politics intersected with school desegregation see Ely, Crisis of 
Conservative Virginia; Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance; James Howard Hershman,
Jr. There’s a Rumbling in the Museum: The Opponents o f Virginia’s Massive Resistance 
(University of Virginia: Unpublished PhD dissertation, 1978).
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to schools to be built or expanded by the bond.62 This was not an overwhelming 
approval of public education by the City, but forced Roanoke onto a particular 
path regarding school desegregation in the short term. As James Hershman has 
explained, Virginia’s massive resistance legislation tightened the school bond 
market. According to the legislation, a district’s schools would be forced to close 
in the event of desegregation. This would cause an expensive private school 
voucher system to be implemented, putting great strain on city and county 
treasuries.63 Though Virginia’s constitution provided that the state would pay off 
debt in cases of municipality default, northern bankers were not satisfied. Lorin 
Thompson commented at the time that "any plan to liquidate the public school 
system in favor of a private arrangement as the massive resisters 
contemplated... would necessitate an immediate settlement with the 
bondholders.”64
Roanoke’s business community and its leaders who played an important 
role on the school board knew that efforts at desegregation could cause school 
closings and unrest between those who strongly favored or opposed 
desegregation. Unrest caused uncertainty about bond issues on the New York 
market and would make it difficult to find investors for Roanoke’s debt. At this
62 “School Bond Issue Passes 6,412 to 5259” Roanoke Times, March 12, 1958. The political 
alliance between wealthy, white Southwest Roanoke and Northwest was an unlikely one, but 
both groups pushed hard for the bond’s passage. The PTAAIIiance, an African American school 
group, had twelve members speak at a public hearing on the bond and gave a donation of 10% 
of its treasury ($30) to the Citizens Committee for Schools, an organization promoting the bond.
63 James H. Hershman, Jr. “Public School Bonds and Virginia’s Massive Resistance” Journal of 
Negro Education, Vol. 52, no. 4. (Autumn, 1983), 402-403.
64 Hershman, “Public School Bonds and Virginia’s Massive Resistance.” 408.
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time, Little Rock was receiving national attention because of its fight against 
school desegregation. City councilmen in Roanoke must have reflected on Little 
Rock’s own fairly moderate, business minded city council as that city became 
embroiled in conflict. Little Rock had been poised for a major economic boom 
following the creation of the Little Rock Air Base and Little Rock Industrial District 
in 1951. In fall 1957, the director of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce,
Everett Tucker, despaired as the city lost industrial prospects that could not move 
to a place with major racial conflict and no high schools.65 Contrasting this 
situation, many media reports favorably compared Charlotte. In fact, it was one of 
the only southern cities with racial conflict to actually see increases in new 
business, a fact certainly noted by Roanoke’s business leaders.66
In January 1959 the Virginia Supreme Court and a Federal District Court 
found the school closing laws illegal. With court decisions throwing out many 
Massive Resistance laws and the Federal intervention at Little Rock, Virginia 
changed its model of massive resistance. In response to the efforts by state 
courts, the General Assembly repealed Virginia’s compulsory education 
requirement and suggested to municipalities that they had no power to enforce 
local compulsory education requirements. 67 The state government provided pupil
65 Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, The Crisis that Shocked the Nation (New 
York: Free Press, 2007), 310-311. A national company, like Proctor and Gamble could not be 
seen as supporting a segregationist city. Additionally, their workers would have no public 
schools at which their children could enroll.
66 Douglas, Reading, Writing, Race, 74-75.
67Heinemann, Harry Byrd o f Virginia, 347; Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 23, 
1959, 11-12.
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scholarship grants to allow students to attend (presumably segregated) private 
schools or public schools in another school district.68
With the threat of state enforced school closing over, the Roanoke School 
Board began to push back against the program of Massive Resistance. On 
August 17, 1959, the School Board declined to renew membership in the Virginia 
Education Association which had strongly supported segregationist positions. 
Although this symbolic step might seem inconsequential, it sent a clear message 
to the forces of Massive Resistance in the state capital. On September 8th, the 
City Council passed an ordinance requiring compulsory school attendance in 
reaction to a Virginia law designed to make school optional for white children too 
poor for private segregated academies. The School Board did continue to 
provide pupil scholarships to students who applied and met requirements for the 
scholarships, though some students still could not afford private schooling even 
with the grants.69 Whether the Board felt new freedom to act with their bond issue 
passed (and a revenue source independent of Richmond) or because massive 
resistance seemed to be floundering in Virginia and elsewhere, by attacking 
Richmond’s last attempts at Massive Resistance, Roanoke stated its preference 
for “passive resistance.” The small challenges did not add up to a major revision 
in thinking, but a gradual recognition that change would eventually come. The 
City’s leadership embraced the technique of all deliberate delay by slowing any
68 Regulations of the State Board of Education Governing Pupil Scholarships, Adopted June 25, 
1959. In addition, these regulations provided that scholarships could only be approved for non­
sectarian schools within the United States.
69 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, August 17, 1959, 11. Roanoke City School Board 
Minutes, September 21, 1959, 2-3.
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integration. The technique worked for many years despite protest from 
Roanoke’s African American community.
Roanoke’s Racial Pioneers
This protest came in the form of a letter to the School Board from NAACP 
Lawyer, Reuben Lawson, who informed the board that 34 students sought 
transfer to “NON-SEGREGATED schools nearest to their homes.”70 The Board 
did not deal with the petition, but let the state board assign the children. The 
State Pupil Placement Board determined that nine of the children could not be 
denied admission to white schools except due to race. These nine were 
scheduled to begin September at three white schools in Roanoke. Twenty-eight 
of the rejected students and an additional seven filed a federal desegregation suit 
in August of 1960. The case became known as Cynthia Greene et al. v. School 
Board of Roanoke City. The case worked its way through the court system with 
one additional student being admitted to a white school. As the opinion in the 
1962 court of appeals case in Cynthia Green, et. al. v. School Board of Roanoke 
stated, “In practice, the state Pupil Placement Board's role in the assignment of 
pupils is largely a formality.” Judge Sobeloff went on to state that “the pupil 
assignment system in effect in the City of Roanoke ... is, as demonstrated by the 
facts, infected throughout with racially discriminatory applications of assignment 
criteria.” African American students needed to live closer to a white school than a 
black school, score significantly higher on standardized tests than white students,
70 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, June 20, 1960, 8-12. Emphasis in original document. It is 
also important to note the written “protest”, in keeping with Roanoke’s “politics of civility.”
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and voluntarily apply for such a transfer. The Pupil Placement Board mistakenly 
rejected one student who lived closer to a white school and five students whose 
younger siblings scored too low on standardized tests. According to the School 
Board, African American students needed to be smarter than their white 
classmates to “to avoid placing any Negroes in white schools ‘who would be 
failures.’”71 The students chosen to meet the nearly impossible requirements 
were all the best and brightest of the African American community, yet most did 
not graduate.72
Of the students who were denied transfer, many were only told a few days 
before classes began so they did not have enough time to appeal the decision. 
The City’s resistance in court demonstrated their reluctance to allow any 
desegregation, a narrative that would be remembered differently by leaders and 
the public years later. While the School Board and NAACP fought in court over 
the students whose transfer requests had been rejected, the accepted students 
prepared for new schools.
On September 6th, 1960, the first black school children desegregated 
several elementary schools without incident. On September 7th, however, Cecilia 
Long and Eula Poindexter confronted a white crowd in front of Monroe Junior 
High. As Cecilia Long, “drove up to the school...there were these [white] people” 
that were “lined up on the sidewalks and looking really angry.” In addition to
71 Sobeloff, Chief Judge, and Boreman and J. Spencer Bell, Circuit Judges, Decision in Cynthia 
Green, et al. vs. School Board o f the City o f Roanoke, May 22, 1962, Records for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, Richmond, Virginia, Correspondence Relating to Cases 1891- 
1977, Box 702.
72 As this paper will elaborate, though they were very intelligent and members of the top Roanoke 
families, many did not graduate from Roanoke City schools.
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throwing eggs and tomatoes at the car, they “yelled all sorts of things..., like ‘go 
back to where you are supposed to be’, ‘coons get out of the neighborhood...’” 
Cecilia endured the abuse while thinking “gosh, we’re just coming to school....”73 
The incident was not reported in the Roanoke Times account of the first 
day of integration. Although the paper had reporters present, they downplayed 
white opposition to promote Roanoke’s moderate and racially conscious image. 
National news outlets, including the New York Times echoed that “Negro and 
White children attended classes together, without incidents” on the sixth, but 
neglected to mention any resistance on the seventh.74 Roanoke’s leadership 
knew that national media coverage would focus on the first day of desegregated 
school. Yet threats of violence towards African American students on the second 
day did not cause concern for city leaders, as long as it stayed out of local and 
national media outlets.
Other African American students from the first “pioneering” or 
desegregating generation had similar problems with desegregating the previously 
all-white schools. With the prevalence of scattered integration, particularly in the 
first years, white teachers and students often marginalized or treated African 
Americans poorly. To be one of a few African American students moved to a 
strange, white world proved very difficult. Leonard A. Williams’ children had 
serious problems acclimating to the predominantly white school. He recalled that
73 Reverend Cecilia Long. Interview with Lillian Howard Potter, November 4, 1995, Hollins 
College, Roanoke, Virginia, as quoted in Potter, “We Went About It Peacefully”, 53.
74 “Richmond Opens All White School to 2 Negro Girls”, New York Times, September 7, 1960, pg 
1.
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“they were hurt by the way they were treated in grammar school” and “they come 
home crying ‘bout what the kids said. They just didn’t want to be around the white 
kids to go to high school” and would have quit school had they been forced to 
attend the white high school. Williams eventually allowed them to transfer to 
Addison.75
In 1969, the school board investigated the pioneering students’ 
experience. Of the seventeen African American students to desegregate schools 
in 1960-61 (and who were no longer in Roanoke’s school system), only 9 
graduated from Roanoke High Schools with three attending college. Of the 
students who did not finish high school in Roanoke, two of the students 
transferred out of the area and five dropped out.76 An almost 30% drop out rate 
was extremely high attrition for children chosen as the best and brightest of the 
community. These were children of Roanoke’s most prominent families. Future 
mayor, Noel Taylor’s daughter integrated early and NAACP President, Reverend 
Raymond Wilkinson’s daughters formed part of the first integrated cohort. Other 
students applying for placement into previously white schools were the children 
of ministers, doctors, and dentists. The problems encountered by these students 
did not become part of the “popular memory” or community narrative on 
desegregation despite their high standing in the community.
In July of 1962, Roanoke began moving beyond the initial desegregation 
under pupil placement plans. U.S. District Judge Thomas Michie required the
75 Interview with Leonard Williams, 29-30.
76 “Desegregation in the Roanoke City Schools”, Report attached to Roanoke City School Board 
Minutes, March 25, 1969. One of the students who dropped out later received his/her GED.
32
School Board to plan for the full desegregation of the schools in eight months. 
The initial plan, created by the school superintendent E.W. Rushton, called for a 
gradual desegregation of a few grades per year starting with the 1963-64 school 
year and being completed by the 1967-68 school year. The plan also contained 
an escape clause by which “any pupil assigned to a school in which his race is in 
the minority may transfer to a school selected by the superintendent in which that 
race is in the majority.”77 This plan had serious flaws. It did not allow for any 
integration of faculty, the timeline of desegregation was too long, and the “escape 
clause” would not stand up in court after recent rulings.78 By 1964, the School 
Board put forth a modified plan that solved the major issues of the initial effort. 
This plan passed federal scrutiny but progress was slow. Like Roanoke,
Charlotte disguised its stasis by celebrating token desegregation even while 
flouting many of the laws which would increase integration.79 The African 
American community became impatient with the sluggish change.
While Roanoke’s schools slowly achieved token desegregation, the city’s 
confrontation over public accommodations and civil rights reached its zenith. The 
black community hoped that the city might close a major open garbage dump 
located in the heart of its community. This issue had been around for years and 
was a serious blight in their neighborhoods. Only after community organizations 
threatened to hold “Birmingham-style demonstrations” and mass meetings did 
the city take action. Where such events threatened to harm its reputation and
77 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, February 25, 1963, 5.
78 Roanoke City School Board Minutes, June 27, 1963, pg. 1.
79 Douglas, Reading, Writing, Race, 75-76.
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damage its business-friendly image, white Roanoke acted on the demands of the 
NAACP.
The Non-Violent Movement Comes to Roanoke
Roanoke’s most vocal civil rights controversy involved the operation of an 
open dump. The Washington Park dump was located squarely in the black 
Northwest section of Roanoke. The historic neighborhood of Gainesboro, 
because of an older settlement by the same name at the location, was the heart 
of the African American community in Roanoke. The city used rock from a quarry 
nearby for construction purposes as the economy exploded in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The dump had long been in existence and for just as 
long, the African American community protested against its ugly presence. Years 
later, this empty quarry proved to be a perfect place for the city to dump trash. 
Black residents remember the dumping at least as early as the 1920s. In 
September of 1953, the Roanoke Tribune, a weekly African American newspaper 
reported on citizens who, “having become exhausted after years of wishful 
waiting, have united to obtain absolute discontinuance of an open dump which 
the City is operating right in the midst of a thickly populated section of the city.”80 
Unfortunately, the City Council would not “agree without delay to discontinue this 
open dump and thereby remove that terrible blot from our ‘All-American City”’ as
80“ Irate Citizens Unite to Fight Health Hazard”, Roanoke Tribune, September 26, 1953. 
Unfortunately most extant copies of the Roanoke Tribune were destroyed in a fire at the 
newspaper. Most of the remaining run can be found at the State Library of Virginia in 
Richmond.
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the Tribune’s editor, F.E. Alexander hoped.81 Frank W. Claytor spoke on behalf of 
the African American community, saying that no improvements had been made 
for the previous two years despite promises of reform. The Council countered 
that the dump was still two years away from being filled, when it could become a 
park for the Gainesboro neighborhood. Despite a report by Virginia’s Health 
Commission urging closure, the Council unanimously adopted a motion to study 
the health effects of the dump and look into costs of a new incinerator or 
landfill.82 In other words, delay. The dump would not be closed in the promised 
two years and it became a wound to Roanoke’s African American community that 
continued to fester.
The dump was within smelling distance of Lucy Addison High School, 
Burrell Memorial Hospital, the Lincoln Terrace Housing Projects, First Street 
Baptist Church, Hill Street Baptist Church, and several other institutions of the 
black community. The metric of smelling distance is germane because the 
residents could smell it well. According to Reverend Edward Burton, it was “an 
open dump... I emphasize the term dump, now, and I’m saying dump and not 
landfill... in the landfill, of course, they continue to cover it over and in this open 
city dump they did not cover it over.”83 Juanita Taylor remembers “big rats and 
things were running all over Orange Avenue, all over Lincoln Terrace, all over
81 F. E. Alexander, “Editorial: Virginia Health Bulletin Condemns Open City Dump”, Roanoke 
Tribune, September 26, 1953.
82 Roanoke City Council Minutes, September 28, 1953, pg 450.
83 Rev. Edward T. Burton, Interview with Michael A. Cooke, June 3, 1992, Oral History Collection, 
Harrison Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia. 7.
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everywhere. Great big rats. Not mice, rats.”84 In the summer of 1962, a dead 
horse was thrown into the dump. Reverend Burton saw this throwing of the horse 
“in the dump and I sort of think that ...just...blew the lid off.”85
In early 1963, it was announced that the city would close the dump by 
June 1. A few months later, city manager Arthur Owens announced that this date 
was impossible to meet because of repairs needed to an incinerator that was to 
replace the dump. The new closing date was scheduled for February of 1964, 
outraging an African American community tired of delay. In May, members of the 
NAACP and Reverend Wilkinson attended a City Council meeting and 
threatened demonstrations. Wilkinson told the City Council “we are willing to walk 
[and] to demonstrate.”86 He also criticized the delaying of the Council by asking 
“How long do you want us to have to wait? My people are tired o f ... of this old, 
ugly subject.”87 The phrase “Birmingham-style demonstrations” swept through the 
white and black communities in Roanoke. The actual demonstrations planned by 
the NAACP involved mothers living in Gainesboro. They ‘were going to come 
down... to march around Washington Park dump and say, “Look ya’II this is not 
healthy.’”88 The gendered protest fit the “respectable and civilized” mold that most 
politics in Roanoke followed. By using mothers and baby carriages, the Roanoke
84 Juanita Taylor, Interview with George Heller, May 27, 1992, Oral History Collection, Harrison 
Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia, 3-4.
85 Burton, 8.
^ “Demonstrations Feared Unless Park Dump Closed”, Roanoke Times, May 14, 1963.
^ “Demonstrations Feared...” Roanoke Times, May 14, 1963.
88 “Fred,” white male school teacher, 7.
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NAACP sent a message parallel to other non-violent protests that emphasized 
the humanity of marginalized African Americans. The demonstration had been 
extensively planned out. Even with such an emotional issue that had plagued the 
community for decades, NAACP leaders prepared the participants to remain 
disciplined and “civilized.” It was also notable that the protest was entirely female 
driven. The NAACP leadership and members of City Council were all male. With 
the female protesters, the African American leaders distanced themselves from 
those actually protesting. The gendered protest fit within Roanoke’s politics of 
respectability. Male African American leaders avoided participation in the civil 
disobedience.
A leader who broke Roanoke's code of “respectable” protest was 
Reverend James Allison, a white minister for the Raleigh Court Presbyterian 
Church. Allison called the dump “immoral” and threatened that “this is the kind of 
thing from which social riots are made. I submit that this is a danger.”89 
Surprisingly, Allison’s comments drew more criticism from local leaders and 
citizens, than Wilkinson’s. Allison became one of the primary spokespersons for 
the movement to close the dump. He declared it evidence of a “monumental 
indifference in the well-being of black people” in Roanoke.90 The white 
newspapers, the Roanoke Times and Roanoke World-News, both printed 
editorials critical of the ministers, but the World-News went farther, in arguing that 
the dump was not a racial issue. The editorial board felt that
89 Reverend James A. Allison, interview with Lillian Howard Potter, January 10, 1996, Lewis-Gale 
Hospital, Salem, Virginia. As quoted in Potter, “We Went About It Peacefully”, 61.
90 Interview with Reverend James Allison.
37
It [was] highly unfortunate... that two ministers, one white and one 
Negro, should raise the specter of racial demonstrations and even 
of riots over the city’s inability to close the open dump in 
Washington Park... Their words could have the effect of stimulating 
just such trouble as Birmingham has been witnessing.91
The editorial also argued that
Negro Citizens of the community, particularly those who reside near 
the dump, would have the most to lose by any sort of mass 
demonstrations. These inevitably would raise tensions and set back 
the Negro’s drive for equality under the law and social progress... A 
bit more temperance of expression and considerable amount of 
restraint are what is needed.
The white community knew the dump was a serious problem, but the
threat of demonstrations or violence deflated any will to solve this
problem. White Roanokers reserved their strongest anger for Allison as a
white minister who acknowledged the black demands and favored
supporting them. In the overall scheme of maintaining white political
power, Allison’s vocal response was ultimately dangerous to the status
quo. Similar anger was reserved for the Episcopal Bishop William
Marmion, another liberal clergyman who supported desegregation.92
Additionally, 1963 had been a major year for the Civil Rights movement in
Birmingham, and the images of Bull Connor with his attack dogs and water hoses
were vivid in the minds of Roanokers who had seen this broadcast over the
evening news only months before. Likewise, nearby Danville, Virginia had
received some of the largest and most violent civil rights demonstrations in
91 “Intemperate Language And Racial Tension Cannot Solve Dump Problem”, Roanoke World- 
News, May 15, 1963.
92 Marmion had long fought internally within the Episcopal diocese to desegregate the Church’s 
summer bible camp.
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Virginia. Martin Luther King had made a well publicized appearance, something 
Roanoke’s white leaders dreaded. Years later, Wilkinson commented that “when 
the thing got hot in Danville... we got closer together... under the administration 
of former [Roanoke] Mayor Stoller.”93 Wilkinson partially credited this 
communication with achieving NAACP goals without as many demonstrations.
With protests that crossed gender and racial lines and openly confronted 
the city’s power, along with a tense national environment, the city’s white 
leadership knew it had to create a quick solution. Roanoke’s most powerful men 
responded to the potential racial problems by reviving the old biracial committee 
that had not met since school desegregation in 1960. The committee declared it 
imperative to close the dump by June 1, 1963 if race relations were to be kept 
harmonious. The group drew up several plans and finally decided that the best 
one would create a landfill in the predominantly white, but sparsely populated 
East Gate neighborhood. Three of the group’s members pitched this idea to the 
mayor. The entire committee did not go because “two or three [members] who 
[they] felt could do the best job” would be less intimidating to those in charge.94 
The mayor agreed with the plan and put it to the City Council soon after. The City 
Council reluctantly agreed to close the dump by a vote of 4-2 in a meeting behind 
closed doors.95
“NAACP Praises Fairness,” Washington Post, October 31, 1965.
94 Lawrence Hamlar, Interview with Lillian Potter Howard, January 5, 1996, Roanoke, Virginia. As 
quoted in Potter, “We Did It Peacefully”, 65.
95 “Stoller Calls Council To Act On City Dump,” Roanoke World-News, May 23, 1963
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The city’s leadership and business elite often decided racial issues behind
closed doors. Following the city dump protest, Roanoke’s leaders and the biracial
committee decided that lunch counters and public areas had to be desegregated
to avoid further demonstrations. This was primarily accomplished through an
“interracial group working privately,” including, “John Hancock, the [now]
deceased Chairman of Roanoke Steel and several other prominent people.”96
The group planned for:
one white person and one black person, [which] they assigned... to 
lunch counters throughout the City and drugstores... Two or three 
days later the Roanoke Times and World News came out with an 
editorial congratulating Roanokers for accepting integration unlike 
other southern cities that had had so many problems. The idea 
was that if you could tell people they did something, and it was 
done they would be satisfied. And indeed it worked out very well.97
The school board continued this pattern, frequently acting out of the public eye
and taking special care in the language it used concerning actions related to
desegregation. Nearly every meeting on desegregation required the presence of
the city attorney, because any decisions made by the School Board could have
far reaching consequences in this time period.
In communities like Roanoke or Charlotte, demonstrations could
successfully force city leaders to take action because they “were acutely aware
of their national image on racial issues.”98 Greensboro, North Carolina served as
the most well-known example of such demonstrations. Both Roanoke and
Greensboro featured similar percentages of African Americans, and the white
96 Interview with “Fred,” 7.
97 Interview with “Fred,” 7.
98 Davison Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race, 89.
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leadership considered itself “beacon[s] of southern progressivism” committed to 
“good race relations.”99 Yet Roanoke’s “respectable” protest never reached the 
level of participation of that found in Greensboro. Unlike Greensboro, activism in 
Roanoke always originated with African American elites, not students.
One possible explanation for Roanoke’s unique history compared to that 
of Greensboro, a similar city, is that Roanoke lacked a Historically Black College. 
This provided a radical element of change in Greensboro. By launching the 
student sit-in movement, Greensboro’s black community clashed directly with the 
white power structure, defining more equal relations that were not based on 
“civilities.” In Greensboro’s protests, the students “were the only ones who could 
have begun the sit-ins.”100 While the entire African American community later 
joined in the demonstrations, the students had an ability to protest because they 
could “speak up loudly... without fear of economic reprisal.”101 In Roanoke, no 
student element radicalized the black community, which eventually felt the effects 
of such “smooth” relations. This is not to say that high school students did not 
attempt to fill this role. In some communities, like Chicago, high school students 
were intimately aware of the substandard conditions in predominantly African 
American schools. These students, inspired by the non-violent and direct action 
movements of the period, used sit-ins, walkouts, and boycotts to protest school
"W illia m  H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black 
Struggle for Freedom  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 6-10.
100 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 94.
101 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 94.
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policies and conditions.102 A teacher at Lucy Addison High School explains why
similar actions did not occur in Roanoke:
What happened was there was a fellow in town who patterned 
himself as a Black Panther. He dressed in the black leather jacket, 
the black clothes, the beret, the bandana and he carried a 
briefcase. I think he came several times to have a conference with 
the black Principal, man to man... He invited this young man in 
with his outfit and this attache case...Well again, this is all hearsay 
after the fact, but supposedly Mr. Day said, “What is on your mind?”
And he started going through this litany of black power philosophy 
at the time... [Mr. Day] got up from his desk, he took off his coat, 
put it on the back of a chair and said, “Son, let me tell you 
something. I have worked all my life for this day. If you and any of 
your actions screw it up then you will answer to me.” After he took 
off his coat he rolled up his sleeves, and in effect confronted what 
he considered to be a potential with counter potential, and that is 
the last we heard of the black militant coming on campus for any
1 0 3reason.
Roanoke’s conservative middle class would not allow protest or any Black 
Nationalist politics, particularly in schools. In communities like Greensboro, 
students mostly avoided college administrators who tried to snuff out dissent by 
threatening expulsion to students who attempted to get arrested protesting.104 
The absence of significant activism from students became a defining feature of 
Roanoke’s response to the civil rights movement. This would influence city 
leader’s actions during the next phase of integration and indeed, “civility” also 
defined busing in Roanoke.
102 Dionne Danns, “Chicago High School Students’ Movement For Quality Public Education, 
1966-1971,” Journal o f African American History Vo\. 88:2 (Spring, 2003), 138-150.
103 “Fred,” 10-11. The teacher’s derisive tone regarding Black Nationalist style and politics 
reinforce the status such students held in Roanoke.
104 Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 130-135.
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Roanoke For Busing?
On March 9, 1965, Reverend Raymond Wilkinson chastised the school 
board for failing to erect a new Junior High School in Northwest Roanoke.105 
Booker T. Washington Junior High had long been the only black Junior High in 
the city and it was extremely overcrowded. In 1962, the enrollment for Booker T. 
Washington was at 684 although it was only built to hold 500. The overcrowded 
conditions were supposed to have been alleviated by the bond issue of 1958, but 
the black community was, according to Rev. Wilkinson, “put up on a scaffold of 
promise in 1958 that cost $600,000. [The School Board] broke the scaffold and 
[the black community] fell in a valley of need and want surrounded by broken 
promises.”106 Despite the abstract analogies, the black community was serious 
about its demands. The school board pointed out that the land for a new junior 
high was in conflict with a spur of Interstate 581, so construction was delayed 
until this was resolved.107 Although this was a legitimate excuse, the school 
board had more trouble explaining the many under capacity white schools and 
the overcrowded black schools.
In 1966-67, Roanoke finished desegregating its schools according to
school board plans. Despite the completion of their plan, the “fully integrated area
105l_ynn Hancock. “ ’Our Way to Freedomsville’: Raymond R. Wilkinson and Roanoke’s Civil Rights 
Movement. Prepared for the Western Virginia Historical Society. Nov. 29, 1994. As quoted by 
Roanoke Resident, Reverend Ivory Morton.
106Letter to the Roanoke City School Board from Rev. Raymond Wilkinson, March 9, 1965.
107Roanoke County School Board Minutes, March 9, 1965, 1-2. The 1-581 issue has more far 
reaching problems for the Roanoke African American community. The city constructed the 
Orange Avenue on-ramp over an African American cemetery, necessitating movement of the 
several graves. The project also forced the relocation of several houses in this primarily African 
American neighborhood, causing the subsequent closing of many small businesses and 
economic depression in the area.
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schools” did not appear as successfully integrated as proposed.108 During the 
1967-68 school year, of the four high schools in the area, desegregation had 
occurred at William Fleming and Jefferson (15% and 10% African American 
respectively), but Patrick Henry remained all white and Lucy Addison all black. 
The junior high schools reflected similar numbers with several schools 
maintaining segregation or having token integration (Breckinridge Junior High 
had 3 black students in a total population of 926). Even formerly integrated 
schools like Melrose Elementary became re-segregated due to changing housing 
patterns and white flight. Faculties were somewhat desegregated but on an even 
more modest scale than that of students.109 The primary cause of the continued 
segregation was extensive housing segregation. As long as Roanoke’s black and 
white communities remained separated, the school board had no way to 
integrate schools without requiring transportation. Of course, school jurisdiction 
lines had not been drawn to promote integration, but even an earnest effort 
would not have created schools with a racial balance proportional to Roanoke’s 
population.
By 1969 the situation had not improved with only one white student in the 
otherwise all black Lucy Addison High School. Patrick Henry High School 
remained all-white. The junior high and elementary schools also made little 
improvement. The black community became impatient and filed an appeal to the
108 “Fully Integrated Area Schools Open: First Day in City Termed ‘Smooth’”, Roanoke World- 
News, September 6, 1966.
109lnterrogatories, Roanoke Office of the Superintendent, October 26, 1967. This table is 
reproduced in Appendix B and contains the numbers and ethnicities enrolled in Roanoke city 
schools as well as Faculty and Staff employed in each school.
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district court seeking further racial balance in the schools. A three Judge panel 
decided the case on June 17, 1970, ruling that Roanoke schools had “failed to 
dismantle its dual school system and [was] not presently operating a unitary 
system.”110 The court went on to say that the case of “Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed. controls this school case.”111 This decision meant that 
Roanoke would need more racially balanced schools and would have to rely on 
mandated busing to achieve this balance.
In 1970, busing was extremely controversial throughout the nation. 
President Nixon argued against using busing to achieve desegregation and many 
whites in the North and South, sided with him. Judge James B. McMillan had 
decided in the Swann case that the only way to desegregate the large Charlotte 
school district was through busing. Schools in the inner city would be grouped 
with those in the suburbs and an equal number of people would be cross-bused 
between the two.112 The “cross-busing” plan was particularly controversial 
because so many students would be forced to attend schools outside their 
neighborhood.
In Roanoke, the school board avoided cross-busing. A former member of 
the school board explained: “We had a busing-out plan. We closed the schools in 
the inner-city and bused them out. That kept down [white] resistance because
110United States Fourth Court of Appeals, Cynthia Greene V. Roanoke School Board, June 17, 
1970, 2.
111 Green v. Roanoke School Board, 3.
112 Bernard Schwartz, Swann’s Way: The School Busing Case and the Supreme Court, (New 
York; Oxford University Press, 1986) 18-19.
45
there was not any cross-busing, it was one way.”113 Clear planning by the school 
board minimized conflict, particularly within the white community. In 1970,
Virginia Governor Linwood Holton received over a thousand letters on busing 
almost all in opposition. Most came from Richmond or Norfolk, with only four from 
Roanoke, the fourth largest metropolitan area in Virginia. Of these, two were for 
busing and two against.114 Busing did not become a divisive force for hate and 
violence in Roanoke as it did in cities from Richmond to Boston.
The comparable lack of racial antipathy, as well as changing housing 
patterns led to the first election of an African American to the City Council. Noel 
C. Taylor, the minister of High Street Baptist Church since 1961, won a tight City 
Council Election after dozens of other African Americans had subsequently lost, 
including Roanoke Tribune editor F. E. Alexander on numerous occasions. While 
Richmond held segregationist rallies attended by hundreds, South Carolina mobs 
attacked the school buses and children themselves, and even supposedly liberal 
Boston strenuously resisted the policy.115 Roanoke elected its first African 
American to the City Council, partly because City leadership managed to limit the 
number of white students who travelled to black neighborhood schools. The 
precedent for avoiding any and all racial conflict helped earn political
113 “Warren,” June 15, 2005, A Black School Board member, pg 4.
114 Linwood Holton Governor Papers 1970, Library of Virginia, Box 144, Education/Busing Folder. 
The numbers cited don’t include correspondence without a return address, though this occurred 
in only a small minority of letters.
115 For more on these traumatic busing episodes in other locations see Ronald Formisano,
Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991) and Timothy J. Minchin, “Making Best Use of the New 
Laws: The NAACP and the Fight for Civil Rights in the South, 1965-1975,” Journal o f Southern 
History Vol. 74: 3 (August 2008), 669-702.
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representation, but forced African American students to attend schools far from
their neighborhoods.
While these schools often provided a good education, a sense of
community was lost with the eventual closing of Booker T. Washington Junior
High and Lucy Addison’s transformation to a city administration building and a
magnet middle school. Many African Americans felt that integration was positive
and offered educational benefits, but some argued that the community itself lost
cohesiveness when the institution of the black school and especially the black
high school disappeared. According to many in the community “the true [Lucy]
Addison [High School] ended in the fall of 1970” with the integration of white
students. Even today, Addison’s high school reunions remain a segregated affair
with no white students invited to them.116According to a former white teacher at
Addison, “Blacks, you know, had decreased from it being their school to it being
just another public institution.”117 The black community that revolved around Lucy
Addison High School and its athletics, teachers, band, and students disappeared.
Another black resident felt that:
After integration, I think, blacks lost a lot of identity. I have people 
that had families up on Henry Street, what we call Henry Street, 
and all that just went away. You could go there and really see just 
about anybody you wanted to see. Then after integration everything 
just went the other way.118
116 Darlene Richardson. Interview with Author, November 17, 2007, Washington D.C. Darlene is 
one of the white students not invited to reunions.
117 Interview with “Fred,” 12.
118 “Hank,” Former black male parent, Interviewed by Peter Jones and Emma Burris, June 27, 
2005, Roanoke, VA, 4.
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With the opening of downtown and white businesses to the black community, 
many shopped where they worked, rather than where they lived. The once 
dynamic black commerce in Gainesboro atrophied.
With busing, the student bodies of Roanoke’s high schools achieved racial 
balances of essentially 3 to 1, the ratio of white to black residents in the city. 
Students interacted in different ways with the increased integration. One area of 
interaction between white and black students, extracurricular activities, brought 
interesting results. Sports were one of the easiest ways to ease the tensions of 
desegregation. According to one female black student, “football and basketball in 
particular, really gave the two different races the ability to get to know each other 
individually and as a team.”119 Black athletes could also provide a role model for 
positive reactions to integration. At Lucy Addison High School, Al Holland, who 
later played for the Philadelphia Phillies and lettered in several sports, helped 
smooth race relations whenever fights broke out.120
In 1973, the Federal Court of Appeals considered Roanoke’s school 
system desegregated enough to remand the Cynthea Green v. Roanoke School 
Board case back to lower district court for monitoring. Later, the city continued to 
combat white flight and changing housing patterns with more busing and 
redistricting. In 1986, Frank Tota would take over control as Superintendent and 
install magnet programs in several different schools. School systems nation-wide 
considered this a way to achieve a more uniform racial balance with less public
119 “Mary,” 1 January 2005, female black student, pg 12.
120 Darlene Richardson, Interview with Author, November 17, 2007
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resistance than busing.121 In trying to maintain a representative racial balance, 
magnet schools provided one method of many available to the school board. 
Unfortunately, with continued re-segregation of housing, schools also became re­
segregated.
Educationally, school integration provided many changes to the school
system with far reaching effects that were both expected and unintended. One of
the most discussed is a generation of children, white and black, who learned to
interact socially together. Lucy Addison’s 1970-71 yearbook mentions the
“problems” but concludes that the students made it work. Likewise, Darlene
Richardson, a white student in the first integrated class at Addison tells what she
learned on the first day:
My Dad, like I said, had scared me to death. He’d said, “Just let one 
of them lay one finger on you and ... I’ll probably be in jail” and 
“they like little blond haired girls.” And he just had me scared to 
death. And I remember going to home room and sitting in the desk 
and there on the desk, you can tell, it’s years and years of hearts 
with initials in it and I’m like, “they’re just like us.” It hit me then, I 
thought, “how does Dad know, he didn’t go to school with them.” I 
don’t know, it just hit me that he didn’t know what he was talking 
about.122
Integrated schooling expanded her perspective on race and led to her role as a 
public historian in which she has helped protect an African American cemetery 
from being destroyed by urban development.
But students’ experiences did not mirror that of teachers. With the 
integration of schools came major changes for white and black teachers. As early
121 Lester, Three Decades o f Delay, 35. Tota was also unpopular as an outsider who made drastic 
changes to the school administration when he arrived.
122 Darlene Richardson, Interview with Author, November 17, 2007, Arlington, Virginia, 4.
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as June, 1954, a Roanoke Times editorial cautioned that African American 
teachers could lose jobs as a result of integration.123 In some school districts, 
African American teachers were fired wholesale as dual school systems became 
unitary ones. Many teachers, including those in western Virginia preemptively left 
their jobs in Virginia for positions farther north in Maryland or Pennsylvania. In 
Lexington, VAthis was particularly devastating to the small African American 
community in which school teachers were the backbone of the middle class. 
Several African American businesses closed as a result of the teacher exodus.
Roanoke did not experience such effects to any major degree. When 
asked whether any teachers were let go as a result of integration, a school board 
administrator responded “no, we didn’t have enough black teachers” to make up 
the 20% needed under Roanoke’s plan.124 In addition, “where there was a white 
principle, [the school board] placed a black assistant principle... so the kids could 
relate. If they got in trouble and went to the office, they could see somebody who 
looked like them.”125
During the early 1960s, Roanoke’s faculty integration was limited. 
Traditionally white faculties remained that way with integration as piecemeal as 
that of students. By the mid 1960s, Federal Court rulings made it clear that 
integration had to come to faculties to a greater extent and Roanoke responded 
with increases in faculty transfers. The school administration scrutinized these
123 “Editorial: Caution in School Integration,” Roanoke Times, June 13, 1954.
124 Interview with “Warren,” 5.
125 Interview with “Warren,” 4.
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very thoroughly. One teacher requested a transfer to an all-black school in order
to teach a more desirable subject. He describes his interview:
‘Well [name redacted], everything sounds alright but we just wanted 
to check you out to make sure you weren’t some kind of radical or 
something.’ See the idea, at that time—if a white person had— I 
guess, and I am not saying this is a compliment to me—but if a 
white person out of the blue said in this time, ‘I want to go to an all 
black school,’ they had a legitimate concern. ‘What is this guy’s 
motivation to be here? Does he have an agenda or is he living in 
some kind of world in which he really doesn’t know about things.’126
Though student integration remained scattered, the changes affected faculty
retention. In each year that the level of desegregation noticeably increased,
1960-61 and 1970-71, or threatened to increase, like 1955-56, the school system
saw white teachers flood out of the occupation. School board minutes list the
reasons as “transferred out of school district”, “retired early”, “left the profession”,
or “personal reasons.” Yet, the specter of teaching desegregated classrooms
loomed for many of these teachers and must be considered as an unspoken
motive.
The exodus of teachers on the eve of major school desegregation events
had unintended results on educational outcomes, both positive and negative
effects. Presumably, teachers uncomfortable enough with integration to leave
school would not treat African American and white children equally and possibly
discriminate as some interviews indicate. Sandra Smith Jordan recalls her first
year of integration:
I, myself, was put in a school that teachers point blank told me,
‘hey, we didn’t ask you niggers to come here, and I got mine. You
126 Interview with “Fred,” 6.
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get yours the best way you can.’ My ninth grade education was 
nada- nothing.127
One pioneering African American student described her experience with teachers
unsure of how to handle African American students:
The teaching systems were different. The 7 of us that went in into 
Monroe, we were all gifted kids. Very good in grades, the best of 
quality I guess of the students, as far as grades. However, the 
teachers did not acknowledge us. We were just like we weren’t 
there as far as being taught. The teachers were afraid of us. They 
didn’t know how to handle us. The older teachers were mean and 
hateful and rude. Teachers were bad. They didn’t want to teach us.
It was just like we weren’t wanted anyway and the students were 
the same way.128
Though some students and teachers had difficult experiences relating in 
the classroom, most studies concluded that desegregation led to positive 
educational outcomes. With the changes in faculty and students, along with the 
closing of inner city schools and the construction of new schools (as a result of 
the 1958 School Bond), Roanoke’s school system underwent incredible changes. 
This had major effects on an urban community that itself had been undergoing 
intense structural change.
The “Renewal” of a Community
Along with the opening and closing of certain neighborhood schools, 
Roanoke’s black northeast and northwest neighborhoods underwent extensive 
physical changes between 1950 and the 1970s. The process began in Roanoke,
127 Sandra Smith Jordan, Interview with George R. Heller, May 30, 1992, Oral History Collection, 
Harrison Museum of African American Culture, Roanoke, Virginia, 13.
128 Interview with “Diane,” 2-3.
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along with cities across America, following the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954. 
The new acts offered significant federal funding and an expanded definition of 
eminent domain to clear “blighted” areas in the inner city. The first housing 
developments in Roanoke were the white Lansdowne Park and the black Lincoln 
Terrace, built in 1952. The first slum clearance projects, as the city council 
described them, targeted black neighborhoods in Northeast Roanoke in 1955.129 
The Commonwealth project resulted in most of Northeast’s housing replaced by 
the Roanoke Civic Center and other private businesses.130
In 1964, a second program of urban renewal cleared much of the 
remaining housing in Roanoke’s northeast. The Kimball Project made many of 
the same mistakes made by the Commonwealth Project. Though both built public 
housing for the displaced residents, it was not big enough and the rent too 
expensive for many former residents. Following the Kimball Project, Roanoke 
planned a major project for Gainsboro in 1968. This project was different from the 
earlier developments because it attacked the neighborhood in a piecemeal 
fashion. Several roads were closed or diverted to make room for easements and 
changes in traffic patterns related to the growth. The “history of promoting the 
‘clearance and removal’ philosophy of... urban renewal” caused the closing of 
such community icons as the Hotel Dumas, The Ebony Club, Lincoln Theater, 
and Palace Hotel.131 Because of the school board’s “busing out” plan, numerous
129 Mary Bishop, “Street by Street, Block by Block: How Urban Renewal Uprooted Black 
Roanoke,” Roanoke Times and World-News, January 29, 1995, 2.
130 Please see detailed map of urban renewal in Appendix C.
131 Claytor, Black Community Observations, 3-5. see also, Mary Campagna-Hamlin, Gainesboro: 
The Destruction o f a Historic Community. (Roanoke, VA: self-published, 1995), 5-7.
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neighborhood schools were closed including Lucy Addison High School. The 
effect on the historic neighborhood was disastrous. With the closure of these 
icons, came the loss of more than just buildings, but a sense of community. 
Henry Street became a shell of its former self with the closing of nearly fifty 
businesses, law offices, doctors’ and dentists’ offices, churches, and theatres.
Concurrent with Urban Renewal, a second feature arrived on the urban 
landscape: the raised highway. In 1966, the city completed a major raised 
highway running from Interstate 81 through the city. City planners routed 
Interstate 581 between the historic, black community of Gainesboro and the 
Commonwealth project. Indeed, one argument for the renewal projects had been 
that the dilapidated housing did not provide “a very prestigious entrance to the 
city” according to Mary Picket, a Roanoke city councilwoman in the 1950s.132 
Despite the neighborhood’s appearance, Zenobia Ferguson told Mindy 
Thompson Fullilove that “we felt like we owned something. But then when the 
community was taken away, and we had to move away from it, it was just sad. It 
took that feeling of pride away from us.”133
While Roanoke’s urban renewal policy had negative outcomes for many 
involved and the community as a whole, it must not be examined only in 
hindsight. The Roanoke City Council came to the project with good intentions 
and thought renewal would bring improvements to all residents, including those
132 Bishop, “Street by Street”, Roanoke Times & World-News, 2. Picket is quoted in an interview 
for the 1995 article.
133 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurt America 
and What We Can Do About It, (New York: Ballentine Books, 2004), 88.
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whose houses would be cleared. This was not the case in Norfolk’s where Mayor 
Fred Duckworth initiated a more sinister brand of clearance between 1956 and 
1958.134 Norfolk’s business oriented civic leadership had participated in 
legitimate early urban planning efforts in the early fifties. With the rise of Massive 
Resistance, however, Duckworth led urban planning in alarming directions. A 
process began where communities that pushed for desegregation suddenly 
became listed for redevelopment and in a matter of months dozens of acres of 
houses would be razed under the Housing Act of 1949. Most of the projects had 
little to no rationale for clearance except the color of the residents’ skin.135 In the 
Atlantic City neighborhood, middle class African Americans had begun moving 
into the mostly single-family dwellings. This neighborhood initially had good 
enough housing that the Norfolk health department targeted it for code­
enforcement meaning that property values would increase from improvements 
made to existing structures. Poor neighborhood (“slums”) property values would 
be better served through demolition and affluent neighborhoods wouldn’t have 
enough code violations to significantly depress property values. Furthermore, the 
area was the only district that was predominantly white but with 10% black 
residents.136 Thirteen of the students in the NAACP’s school integration suit of 
1956 lived in Atlantic City. Redevelopment of the neighborhood was announced 
between the process of discovery and the Judge’s order to integrate the school.
134 Forrest R. White, Pride and Prejudice: School Desegregation and Urban Renewal in Norfolk, 
1950-1959, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992), xv.
135 White, Pride and Prejudice, 103-115.
136 White, Pride and Prejudice, 122-135.
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Between the announcement of redevelopment and initial demolition, only nine 
months passed. By the 1957-58 school year, the threat to integration had been 
averted through demolition diplomacy.137
The contrast here to Roanoke is stark. The attitude within the African 
American community was not monolithic. A. L. Holland described this: “see you 
got your two Ps, preservation and progress. I got a 1997 Ford Ranger, but I 
couldn’t expect to get the price for that like a 2004. So some things you got to let 
go.”138 One anonymous Gainsboro resident said that Henry Street (Gainsboro’s 
primary commercial district) had been “glamorized and romanticized. Henry 
Street was a street of hustlers. Just realize... life was nice, but life was hard.”139 
Roanoke’s process of urban renewal did not aim to cause problems for its 
displaced residents. Efforts were made to create new housing, pay a “fair price”, 
and use land constructively. Neighborhoods were chosen with urban policy, 
though politics was inevitably a part. Yet the forces of urban renewal and school 
closings created major pains for the community’s identity. With the closing of its 
largest landmarks came more than just the loss of bricks and mortar.
Unfortunately, these forces occurred simultaneously with problems for the 
greater city economy. The Norfolk Southern Railroad ended passenger service to 
Roanoke in the 1970s; in the 1980s it transferred its headquarters from Roanoke 
to Norfolk, along with thousands of jobs.140 Roanoke responded to these
137 White, Pride and Prejudice, 138-140.
138 Alphonso Holland, Sr. Interview with author. November 30, 2007, Roanoke, VA, 8.
139 Bishop, “Street by Street”, Roanoke Times and World-News, 6.
140 Dotson, Magic City o f the New South, 241.
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changes in similar ways to rust belt cities by attempting to increase tourism and 
the technology industry, but the economy did not return to previous levels. African 
Americans were often the first fired when jobs were cut, showing the disparities 
that still existed between the two communities despite rhetoric to the contrary.141
Integrating the ‘Star City’
The integration of Roanoke was much more complex than assumed by 
previous scholars. While there were no school closings to evade desegregation 
and widespread violence did not occur, resistance to desegregation was just as 
strong as that in the eastern portion of Virginia. Even in a city that prided itself on 
“smooth” racial relations, the intervention of Roanoke Steel’s John Hancock as 
part of the “secret biracial committee” suggests that reforms would come at a 
speed appropriate to those in power. A style of inside and backchannel 
leadership within Roanoke thwarted African American resistance to urban 
renewal.
With integration, many doors opened educationally for African Americans. 
It is also important to remember the decades of delay and sheer difficulty of 
achieving any semblance of desegregation. While achieving civil rights with 
minimal conflict was a positive characteristic of Roanoke’s style, in the end, it 
proved to be a double-edged sword, cutting the black community off at its roots.
141 Thomas Sugrue, The Origins o f the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit. 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
57
The image of Prince Edward County’s Massive Resistance will always 
remain the symbol for Virginia’s Civil Rights Movement. It is an event that deals 
directly with what Eric Foner called “American Irony.” A female black high school 
student, leading her classmates in a strike against oppressive authorities made a 
great story. Political pressures from below pushed NAACP lawyers farther than 
they wanted to go in the name of freedom. These are ideals enumerated in 
America’s founding documents. Prince Edward County also provides examples of 
how America has never completely lived up to its ideals. A generation of African 
Americans never graduated from high school in Prince Edward County. Violence 
and hate served to remind African Americans who ran that county, as the schools 
were closed from 1959 to 1964. Ultimately, that morality play gained a happy 
ending when fully integrated schools were opened there in 1964. The era of 
Massive Resistance was a powerful time, but scholars need to remember that 
another type of resistance occurred.
The stories of those who lived through events in Roanoke challenged the 
Prince Edward County model of desegregation in Virginia. In Roanoke, massive 
resistance never became an official policy. Yet “smooth” relations did not bring 
meaningful integration. Leaders of the African American middle class agreed to 
minimize open conflict in return for a voice in some city decisions. African 
Americans consistently held appointed positions on the Roanoke School Board 
and Noel C. Taylor was even elected mayor from 1975 to 1992. Despite African 
American representation on the school board, it did not move towards 
desegregation unless forced to do so by judicial mandate.
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In Roanoke, passive resistance kept schools essentially (or completely) 
segregated much longer than massive resistance. Urban renewal brought 
positive changes for Roanoke’s downtown, but at the expense of a black 
community who lost not only bricks and mortar but pieces of their identity and 
history. These are some of the ironies of Roanoke’s Civil Rights Movement. The 
democratic movements, for which the Civil Rights Movement is famous, only 
touched Roanoke briefly. Replacing these were a secret biracial committee that 
successfully integrated many businesses, golf courses, parks, waiting rooms, 
and buses. The School Board resisted change for over a decade and then closed 
inner city schools that whites largely did not want to attend. This smoothing over 
of racial conflicts and reliance on civilized discussion even in the face of 
discrimination created an environment where it was possible for an African 
American to be elected mayor in a City which was overwhelmingly white. 
Roanoke acted like other southern “moderate” cities, but unlike Greensboro, it 
didn’t feature a large activist student population. Though Roanoke bused 
thousands of students, it never bused white students to black schools in as large 
of numbers as Charlotte did in the early 1970s. This created an environment in 
Roanoke that differed greatly from Greensboro, Charlotte, and especially Prince 
Edward County.
For historians of the Civil Rights Movement, it can be tempting to focus 
only on the most scandalous or well-known events. But it can be dangerous to 
make a symbol stand for an entire state. Roanoke shows that discrimination in 
the context of school desegregation cannot be calculated by the number of
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schools closed. Likewise, the 1960s did not inspire popular resistance 
movements in every urban area. Yet even without shuttered schools or a forceful 
protest movement, Roanoke changed dramatically. Policies like the Great Society 
and urban renewal interacted with desegregation in complex ways; bulldozing 
made desegregation somewhat simpler. Finally, we must remember that passive 
resistance kept schools largely segregated much longer than massive resistance. 
Though Roanoke City leaders would prefer to hide this fact, scholars must not.
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Appendix B
Students and Teachers in Roanoke City Schools, 1967-68
African Total African Total
School White American Students White American Teachers
Addison High 0 806 806 6.5 44.3 50.8
William Fleming High 1 ?3D 210 1440 70.4 3 73.4
Patrick Henry High 1387 0 1387 68 0 68
Jefferson High 928 107 1035 56.6 2 58.6
Breckinridge Jr. 923 3 926 47.8 0 47.8
Jackson Jr. 732 732 38.6 0 38.6
Lee Jr. 439 155 594 34.6 3 37.6
Monroe Jr. 539 303 842 44.4 3.2 47.6
B.T. Washington Jr. 0 504 504 1 34.1 35.1
Woodrow Wilson Jr. 722 0 722 37.9 0 37.9
Belmont Elementary 433 0 433 20.7 0 20.7
Crystal Spring Elementary 435 0 435 17.8 0 17.8
Fairview Elementary 427 0 427 17.6 0.2 17.8
Fishburn Park Elementary 208 0 208 10.8 0 10.8
Forest Park Elementary 522 176 698 23.9 4.4 28.3
Garden City Elementary 279 0 279 12.7 0 12.7
Gilmer Elementary 2 193 195 0.3 9.9 10.2
Grandin Court Elementary 208 0 208 9.7 0 9.7
Harrison Elementary 0 448 448 0.5 21.1 21.6
Highland Park Elementary 462 7 469 23.2 0 23.2
Huff Lane Elementary 363 0 363 17 0 17
Hurt Park 0 212 212 0.7 9.5 10.2
Jamison Elementary 
Lincoln Terrace
587 0 587 26.6 0 26.6
Elementary 0 377 377 0.8 16.5 17.3
Loudon Elementary 0 517 517 0.9 21.6 22.5
Melrose Elementary 35 597 632 14.2 12.5 26.7
Monterey Elementary 236 0 236 10.5 0 10.5
Morningside Elementary 353 0 353 15.7 0 15.7
Oakland Elementary 432 0 432 18 0 18
Preston Park Elementary 385 0 385 16.9 0 16.9
Raleigh Court Elementary 308 0 308 12.7 0 12.7
Round Hill Elementary 375 10 385 16.9 0 16.9
Tinker Elementary 
Virginia Heights
119 0 119 6.9 0 6.9
Elementary 530 0 530 23.6 0 23.6
Wasena Elementary 
Washington Heights
351 0 351 14.9 0 14.9
Elementary 176 0 176 8.8 0.1 8.9
West End Elementary 284 101 385 16.8 2.5 19.3
Westside Elementary 208 0 208 9.4 0.1 9.5
Totals 14618 4726 19344 774.3 188 962.3
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Student Enrollment in Roanoke City Schools, 1970-71
School Black Percentage White Percentage Total
Addison High 270 50.1 269 49.9 539
William Fleming High 315 23.3 1036 76.7 1351
Patrick Henry High 147 12.9 991 87.1 1138
Jefferson High 152 16.5 768 83.5 920
Total High School 884 22.4 3064 77.6 3948
Breckinridge Jr. 180 23.4 588 76.6 768
Jackson Jr. 183 19.6 750 80.4 933
Madison Jr. 204 23 683 77 887
Monroe Jr. 166 26.4 462 73.6 628
Ruffner Jr. 269 42.8 359 57.2 620
Woodrow Wilson Jr. 181 21.7 653 78.3 834
Total Junior High 1183 25.3 3495 73.85 4670
Belmont Elementary 67 13.6 425 86.4 492
Crystal Spring Elementary 0 0 468 100 468
Fairview Elementary 0 0 436 100 436
Fishburn Park Elementary 0 0 135 100 135
Forest Park Elementary 277 42.5 374 57.5 651
Garden City Elementary 0 0 318 100 318
Grandin Court Elementary 0 0 225 100 225
Harrison Elementary 465 100 0 0 465
Highland Park Elementary 186 32.5 387 67.5 573
Huff Lane Elementary 68 16.3 349 83.7 417
Hurt Park Elementary 258 76.3 80 23.7 338
Jamison Elementary 6 0.9 653 99.1 659
Lincoln Terrace Elementary 398 100 0 0 398
Melrose Elementary 559 96.5 20 3.5 orme
Monterey Elementary 0 0 428 100 428
Morningside Elementary 0 0 398 100 398
Oakland Elementary 17 3.5 468 96.5 485
Preston Park Elementary 75 18.1 339 81.9 414
Raleigh Court Elementary 1 0.4 270 99.6 271
Round Hill Elementary 78 19.7 318 80.3 396
Virginia Heights Elementary 0 0 610 100 610
Wasena Elementary 0 0 326 100 326
Washington Heights 
Elementary 78 41.9 oppo5 58.1 186
West End Elementary 158 35.8 283 64.2 441
Westside Elementary 185 41.8 258 58.2 443
Totals 2876 25.592 7676 74.408 10552
Grand Total 4943 25.8 14235 74.2 19178
Source: Interrogatories, Roanoke Office of the Superintendent, October 26, 1967, September 
17, 1970.
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